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Mandatory financial reporting processes and outcomes 
 
Abstract 
In an extension to the mandatory financial reporting literature, we consider 
compliance and applicability as intermediate stages in the disclosure decision 
process, and investigate to what extent these measures explain any variance in the 
quantity of disclosure. We use financial instruments disclosures as our empirical 
context because of the level of complexity and diversity of the mandatory 
requirements. We find that neither applicability nor compliance show statistically 
significant association with disclosure quantity. By contrast we find that a firm’s 
financial instruments management programme is an important determinant of both 
applicability and quantity. Finally, we demonstrate the economic consequences of 
applicability, compliance and quantity through their association with audit fees. For 
companies that use financial instruments management programmes to a greater 
extent, audit fees are higher. In contrast, the quantity of financial instruments 
disclosures appears to reduce audit fees.  
 
Key words: Applicability; Compliance; Quantity; Financial instruments; Financial 
reporting; Audit fees. 
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1. Introduction 
The vast literature concerning the important question of ‘what incentivizes 
companies to reveal information’ (see reviews by Healy and Palepu, 2001; 
Verrecchia, 2001; Leuz and Wysocki, 2008; Beyer et al., 2010) is under-theorized 
in a mandatory setting (Glaum et al., 2013). Despite claims that managerial 
discretion is limited when making mandatory disclosure decisions (e.g. Verrecchia, 
2001), empirical studies consistently find incomplete compliance (Tsalavoutas, 
2011; Hassan et al., 2008; Lopes and Rodrigues, 2007), seemingly facilitated by 
imperfect enforcement (Brown and Tarca, 2005; Daske et al., 2008) and driven by 
country-specific factors and voluntary incentives to disclose information (e.g. Street 
and Gray, 2002; Glaum, et al., 2013).  
Using financial instruments reporting as a research context, the purpose of 
this article is to address a gap in the literature that does not differentiate the pre-
disclosure process from the reporting outcome. We explore three inter-related 
dimensions of this problem: applicability; compliance; and the quantity of 
information revealed. Through an examination of financial instruments reporting 
amongst the sample of 58 FTSE100 non-financial firms, we pursue three specific 
research objectives. First, we ask what affects the applicability of, and compliance 
with, International Financial Reporting Standard 7 Financial Instruments: 
Disclosures (2005) (hereafter, IFRS 7). Second, we consider how applicability and 
compliance, alongside the extent of a company’s financial instruments 
management programme, affect the quantity of financial instruments disclosures. 
Third, we examine the economic effects of the mandatory disclosure process and 
outcome. After controlling for known determinants, we estimate the effects on audit 
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fees of: (i) a company’s financial instruments management programme; (ii) the 
applicability of IFRS 7 disclosures; (iii) compliance with IFRS 7 disclosures; and (iv) 
the quantity of information disclosed under IFRS 7 requirements.  
In contrast to prior mandatory disclosure work, we start from the basis that 
accounting standards require a company to explain the results of its investing, 
operating and financing policies and decisions. Some elements of this process 
remain unaddressed. This paper seeks to understand the relationship between 
firm-specific attributes, the process, the reporting outcome and the economic 
consequences of that outcome. We specify four identificatory stages of the 
disclosure process as a motivation for our empirical hypotheses, namely: Is the 
specific requirement applicable? If so, will the company comply? How much 
information should be disclosed in relation with a requirement? What are the 
economic consequences of this decision? 
We adopt the following approach. First, we propose that the nature and 
complexity of a firm’s financial instruments management programme will be 
captured by the level of applicability; where applicability is defined as the number 
of IFRS 7 requirements which the firm is obliged to adhere. Second, compliance 
levels measured in relation to what is applicable are determined by the incentives 
to disclose information (e.g. Street and Gray, 2002; Glaum, et al., 2013). In turn, 
the level of applicability and the level of compliance should determine the quantity 
of information. However, despite identical levels of applicability, some companies 
may have more to disclose because of the nature of their business. Further, we 
question whether the incentives to voluntarily disclose information may be more 
(less) important as a determinant of quantity when the applicability levels are low 
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(high). Finally, we question whether the value of financial instruments and/or the 
quantity of financial instruments disclosures have a complementary or substitute 
effect on audit fees.  
We find the following. First, the overall size of the firm and the extent of 
financial instruments management programmes are statistically positively related to 
the applicability of IFRS 7. Jointly, the following explain 58% of the variability in 
applicability: size, value of total non-derivative financial instruments, risk exposure 
measured as the fair value of derivative financial instruments (hereafter 
‘derivatives’) disclosed, and whether a firm uses derivatives for speculation or 
hedging. We adopt these four proxies to measure the extent of a firm’s financial 
instruments management programme. Second, and contrary to our expectations, 
we find that applicability and compliance are not significant determinants of 
quantity. However, size and holdings of derivatives are significantly positively 
related to the quantity of disclosure. The four proxies we adopt for financial 
instruments management programme (listed above) explain about 25% of the 
variability in quantity. Third, we find that audit fees are statistically and 
economically positively associated with the value of non-derivative financial 
instruments with one standard deviation increase in financial instruments leading to 
27% increase in audit fees. This is partially consistent with the notion that a 
premium is required to compensate for the effort. However, audit fees are not 
associated with derivatives nor whether a firm uses derivatives for speculation or 
hedging purposes. Finally, we find a negative association between audit fees and 
the quantity of financial instruments disclosures. This relation is economically 
important as one percentage point increase in the quantity of disclosure results in 
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one half of one percent decrease in audit fees. This may appear inconsistent but it 
suggests that the audit fee premium can be reduced by a managerial decision to 
reduce information asymmetry. These results are robust to alternative estimation 
procedures. Overall, these results confirm the important role of managerial choice 
in the disclosure decision-making process.  
Our study contributes to the mandatory disclosure literature in several ways. 
Firstly, we shift the focus from compliance as the final outcome of the disclosure 
process (e.g. Street and Gray, 2002; Glaum, et al., 2013) to compliance as an 
additional intermediate stage that might explain various levels of disclosure. 
Secondly, while the compliance literature uses applicability as an instrument to 
calculate compliance, we introduce it as an important factor related to levels of 
disclosure. Thirdly, we propose that the disclosure decision needs to be considered 
alongside any related policies and decisions, such as financial strategy. Fourthly, 
our study contributes to the disclosure literature by providing further evidence that 
the variability in the quantity of disclosed information is not associated with the 
variability in compliance or applicability (Roulstone, 1999; Dunne et al., 2004; 
Chalmers, 2001; Miihkinen, 2012; Bischof, 2009). Fifthly, the identification of these 
three distinct factors is a useful addition to the study of mandatory financial 
reporting (e.g. Lopes and Rodrigues, 2007; Bischof, 2009; Al-Akra et al., 2010; Birt 
et al., 2013). Sixthly, our measure of compliance is far more detailed than in related 
studies (Lopes and Rodrigues, 2007; Birt et al., 2013), which results in a finer 
measurement of compliance, and as such could be useful in other research 
contexts. The trade-off resultant from this more granular measurement approach is 
a smaller sample. Finally, to the best of our knowledge, no prior study has 
 6 
empirically tested the association between audit fees and either the value of 
financial instruments or the quantity of financial instruments disclosures. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a 
brief background, a review of the literature and hypothesis development. Section 3 
outlines the research design, sample and methods. Section 4 discusses the 
results. Finally, Section 5 provides a summary and conclusion. 
 
2. Motivation and related literature  
The compliance literature fails to address a number of fundamental questions 
concerning process and outcome. First, there is an over-reliance on disclosure 
checklists as the outcome measure of compliance and disclosure without due 
consideration of the interaction between variability in compliance and the levels of 
applicability and disclosure quantity. Second, there is not enough attention paid to 
the related managerial choices, policies and strategies that drive movements in 
assets (liabilities) or gains (losses) which underpin the disclosure. Third, the 
implications of voluntarism in a mandatory setting are rarely taken into account. We 
briefly expand on these three issues below.  
With respect to the first concern, checklists can be used to measure 
compliance (e.g. Lopes and Rodrigues, 2007; Al-Akra et al., 2010; Tsalavoutas, 
2011). A recent study by Glaum et al. (2013) finds substantial non-compliance with 
IFRS 3 and IAS 36 across 17 European countries. These findings may be 
explained by unintentional neglect (when management overlook particular 
requirements) or misinterpretation of disclosure rules (e.g. managers conclude that 
certain requirements do not apply). Intentional neglect is more likely to occur in the 
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event of imperfect enforcement (e.g. Brown and Tarca, 2005; Daske et al., 2008). 
Any observed variability in compliance levels might be explained by a company’s 
incentives to disclose (Glaum et al., 2013). Yet, using compliance checklists as an 
outcome variable does not provide a complete explanation of what a company is 
doing and why it is doing it (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004 is a notable exception). 
The index-based approach also does not measure what the company should 
and/or might disclose. Furthermore, compliance, applicability and quantity might be 
related but the association has not previously been tested.  
In terms of the economic effects of disclosure, mandatory disclosures have 
been shown to be the most used and the most useful sections of the annual report 
(e.g. Vergoossen, 1993; Chang and Most, 1985). The primary benefits of providing 
information are the reduction of information asymmetry and the mitigation of the 
adverse selection problem (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Verrecchia, 2001). Voluntary 
disclosure can reduce the cost of capital (Botosan, 1997, 2006), increase liquidity 
(Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000), and reduce the risk premium (Jorgensen and 
Kirschenheiter, 2003). However, silence or omission is a signal that the company is 
“withholding… potentially relevant information from the capital markets” (Glaum et 
al., 2013, p.164).  
Bringing these two strands together – i.e. determinants of compliance and 
disclosure consequences – our challenge is that companies may demonstrate the 
same proportionate level of compliance, but the disclosure might be substantially 
different in volume, scope and technical content. Such diverse disclosure may 
have different economic consequences (i.e. audit fees).  
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As for applicability, we draw on Heitzman et al.’s (2010: 109) argument that 
if an item is material, there is a perceived “duty to disclose” even in the absence of 
a reporting requirement. Heitzman et al. (2010) focus on the concept of materiality 
in a voluntary setting. We transform this and introduce the notion of applicability in 
its place; noting that the two concepts overlap. Additionally, while Heitzman et al. 
(2010) focus on materiality in the decision to disclose a single item (advertising 
expenses), we consider applicability in the context of multiple requirements within 
an accounting standard. 
To address the second concern regarding the range of managerial choices, 
policies and strategies that drive movements in assets (liabilities) or gains (losses) 
which underpin the disclosure, we focus on the nature of the business undertaken 
as a determinant of the disclosure process and disclosure outcome. The 
importance of context on the disclosure decision is not completely new to the 
literature. For example, the ICAEW wrote (2000, p. 14) “risk can only be 
appreciated in the broader context of a company’s strategy”, and Beretta and 
Bozzolan (2004: 269) claimed that ‘the reporting of risk must… consider 
information on strategy, actions, and performance in addition to information 
specifically focused on risk. We propose that companies are likely to have different 
approaches and strategies for managing their financial instruments, and as a result 
they will have different disclosure process options under IFRS 7.  
We use financial instruments reporting because it is an inviting context to 
study these issues. Furthermore, we contest that it is important to look at the 
financial instruments management programme as a determinant of the level of 
financial instruments disclosure. Financial instruments information is of critical 
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importance to users seeking to achieve a balanced understanding of a company’s 
position and performance (e.g. Gebhardt, 2012; Chernenko and Faulkender, 2012; 
Chalmers and Godfrey, 2004; Chalmers, 2001)1. Evidence suggests that the 
disclosures are informative (e.g. Campbell et al., 2011; Seow and Tam, 2002) and 
yet the area remains under-explored (Gebhardt, 2012). The mandatory financial 
instruments disclosure requirements are extensive and allow considerable scope 
for variability (Bischof, 2009; Hassan et al., 2008; Lopes and Rodrigues, 2007; 
Woods and Marginson, 2004; Chalmers and Godfrey, 2004; Chalmers, 2001).    
This brings us to the third concern, i.e. that the implications of voluntarism in 
a mandatory setting are rarely taken into account. The nature and choices 
surrounding financial instruments reporting is complex and controversial (Gebhardt 
2012). Consequently, the final disclosure outcome (in this case, quantity), might 
have a variable economic effect across companies. We extend prior literature by 
examining if financial instruments disclosures convey information about the 
quantity and quality of risk management activities for companies, which in turn 
impact audit fees as a consequence of altered perceptions of audit risk. On the one 
hand, auditors might demand an audit fee premium to compensate for the 
additional effort required to audit financial instruments. On the other hand, greater 
levels of financial instruments disclosures might improve the information 
environment and reduce information asymmetry (e.g. Horton et al., 2013). If an 
improvement in the information environment reduces the audit risk premium, audit 
                                            
1 Note that whilst derivative financial instruments constitute less than 10% of the value of the 
average firm in our sample (cf. Guay and Kothari, 2003), the value of the broader sub-category 
‘financial instruments’ make up almost 53%. 
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fees might be negatively associated with the level of financial instruments 
disclosures.  
We bring together these three research questions together in a four-stage 
approach in Figure 1 and throw light upon the effectiveness of accounting 
regulations and the potential benefits of improved disclosure and enforcement 
mechanisms. Taken together, in this framework, a company’s financial instruments 
management programme appears as an important input in guiding disclosure 
process through applicability and compliance and in determining quantity, as well 
as a direct determinant of audit fees. Additionally, a lower (higher) quantity of 
disclosure may reduce (increase) the audit effort and, consequently, reduce 
(increase) audit fees. Details of related hypotheses are outlined in section 3. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
3 Hypotheses development 
3.1 Hypotheses: Determinants of applicability, compliance and 
quantity of disclosure 
This first set of hypotheses examine what determines the three primary 
dimensions under review: applicability; compliance; and quantity. In applying IFRS 
7, management’s first task is to evaluate which requirements are applicable. The 
main considerations are: whether the underlying item where disclosure is required 
exists, and whether the item is material due to its size or nature. We predict that 
the financial instruments management programme is positively related to the levels 
of applicability. For example, firms that manage interest rate risk using interest rate 
swaps will be obliged to apply requirements related to derivatives and possibly 
hedge accounting, while firms who do not engage in derivatives-based risk 
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management programmes will not. This leads to our first hypothesis (H1 direction 
in Figure 1): 
H1: The overall applicability level of requirements under IFRS 7 increases in 
line with a company’s financial instruments management programme. 
The second decision in the disclosure process is whether to comply with the 
applicable requirements. In an imperfect enforcement environment, certain 
reporting incentives influence compliance. Management will have incentives to 
disclose the required and applicable information under IFRS 7 if the perceived net 
benefits of disclosure are positive (e.g. Botosan, 1997, 2006 [cost of capital 
advantage]; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000 [increased liquidity]; Jorgensen and 
Kirschenheiter, 2003 [impact on risk premium]). Therefore, we examine if the 
proxies for disclosure incentives play a role in explaining the variability in 
compliance (H2 direction in Figure 1). 
H2: Higher level of compliance with IFRS 7 requirements is positively 
associated with the incentives to disclose information. 
After the two process issues are resolved (i.e. applicability and compliance), 
an outcome-oriented decision needs to be made. Management must decide how 
much information to disclose. In a full compliance environment, one would expect 
that a company that needs to disclose more items because of their applicability, 
would disclose more in volume terms. Similarly, for the same level of applicability 
one would expect that a company that has a higher level of compliance would 
disclose more in volume terms. Thus, we assume that any additional requirement 
that is applicable and complied with will contribute to a higher quantity of disclosure 
(H3 direction in Figure 1).  
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H3: The quantity of disclosure is positively associated with levels of 
applicability and compliance. 
As stated in H1, we expect that the nature and scope of a company’s 
financial instruments management programme will affect applicability. In turn, the 
level of applicability is likely to affect the quantity of disclosure. However, even 
where companies’ levels of applicability (and compliance) are the same, the 
volume may vary. This leads to our fourth hypothesis (H4 direction in Figure 1). 
H4: The quantity of disclosure is positively associated with the nature and 
complexity of a company’s financial instruments management programme. 
3.2 Hypotheses: Economic impact of the quantity of financial 
instruments and financial instruments disclosures 
The aim of the second set of hypotheses is to understand the economic 
impact of the quantity of financial instruments and financial instruments 
disclosures. Financial instruments disclosures are complex and controversial 
(Gebhardt, 2012; Bamber and McMeeking, 2016). The demand for audits is 
assumed to be the efficient solution to costly contracting problems where the 
company’s accounting technology, risk management systems and corporate 
governance mechanisms are components of the nexus of contracts (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986). Auditors provide assurance as to the integrity of the 
accounting numbers produced by the company’s accounting technology (Simunic, 
1980). It is well established that there is heterogeneity in companies’ exposures to 
risk and appetites to manage these exposures through financial instruments (e.g. 
Grant and Marshall, 1997). Some types of financial instruments (e.g. payables) are 
less complex and easier to audit than others (e.g. credit default swaps). As such, 
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we question whether the quantity and complexity of financial instruments 
management programme is positively associated with audit fees.  We contend that 
accounting firms will charge a fee premium to firms with large amounts of financial 
instruments because of the additional effort required to audit these items.  
H5a: Companies with large financial instruments programmes are likely to 
pay higher audit fees than companies with small financial instruments 
programmes.  
Next we examine whether the level of disclosed information might affect 
audit fees through an improvement in the information environment. It is claimed 
that increased corporate disclosure levels can reduce information asymmetry and 
the cost of capital (Botosan 1997). If the quantity of financial instruments 
disclosures improves the information environment, this ought to reduce audit risk, 
and hence the audit premium. Taking these factors into consideration, our 
hypothesis is:    
H5b: The quantity of financial instruments disclosures is likely to decrease 
the level of audit fees. 
4. Research design and methods 
4.1. Sample 
This study reviews the IFRS 7 disclosures for the FTSE-100 non-financial 
firms for years beginning on or after 1 January 2007. We consider only the largest 
firms for our sample because the data collection process is an enormously time-
consuming and challenging exercise that requires hand collection and checking of 
133 (as set out in IFRS7) potential items for each observation, many of which are 
complex in nature and lengthy (e.g. derivatives). In addition, the analysis is set in a 
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single jurisdiction to avoid methodological issues associated with various 
institutional factors and enforcement regimes. Furthermore, we focus only on firm-
specific determinants of the disclosure process (applicability and compliance), 
reporting outcome (quantity of disclosure) and the consequences of this disclosure 
decision on audit fees because all firms are exposed to the same institutional 
factors and enforcement regime.  
We choose year 2007 for our sample period because it covers the initial 
period of IFRS 7 implementation. This first-year of adoption is likely to show the 
highest level of variance in disclosure compliance and quantity, although we 
recognise that IFRS 7 has 28 new requirements while 105 are transferred from its 
predecessor, i.e. IAS 32.  
The original sample included 76 non-financial companies, of whom, 10 did 
not report before a substantial amendment was passed in October 2008 that 
altered the Standard2. Of the remaining 66 firms, full data was only available for 58. 
We focus on non-financial firms because their financial instruments disclosures are 
under-studied (Gebhardt, 2012). We exclude financial firms because they typically 
build their business models around holding, exchanging and trading financial 
instruments (e.g. Woods and Marginson, 2004). For instance, a small number of 
large financial institutions hold a dominant share (>90%) of the market for 
derivative financial instruments and control over-the-counter dealing (e.g. Sinkey 
Jr. and Carter, 2000). Instead, non-financial firms predominately use them to 
manage straightforward transaction and economic risk exposure (e.g. Géczy, 
                                            
2 IFRS 7 was effective for years commencing on or after 1 January 2007. Therefore, we used this 
amendment as the cut-off for our sample. 
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Minton, and Schrand, 1997). Evidence of speculation amongst non-financial firms 
is limited3 as evidenced by the Wharton surveys undertaken by Bodnar and 
colleagues e.g. Bodnar, Hayt, Marston and Smithson (1995). In turn, the regulators 
require financial firms to provide higher levels of disclosure to comply with codes of 
best practice (e.g. Basel) which go beyond the requirements of IFRS 7. In addition 
they have put in place stricter supervisory and monitoring arrangements.4  
Our sample is biased towards the largest, most established firms on the 
London Stock Exchange (LSE). This bias may affect our results in two ways. 
Economically, the largest LSE firms operate in a rich disclosure and regulatory 
environment resulting in small variation among these most scrutinized firms. For 
this reason, as we show in Table 3, we find generally high levels of compliance and 
low variability in compliance (if not in quantity of disclosed information). 
Econometrically, the small sample reduces the power of our tests. Nevertheless, 
our findings are important because it is likely that the observed results present the 
lower magnitude bound compared with the case in which the wider sample of firms 
would have been included. As pointed out in Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) and 
Lang, Lins and Maffett (2012), the importance of disclosure and transparency is 
more pronounced for smaller firms that operate in low disclosure environments. 
Similarly, we are careful to note that findings which reject hypotheses cannot be 
generalised to the wider universe of firms. 
                                            
3 Chernenko and Faulkender (2012) show evidence of hedging and speculation amongst non-
financial firms. They suggest that this may be strongest when firms’ executive compensation 
contracts are more performance sensitive. We keenly await further evidence to support this thesis. 
4 See Bischof (2009) for an analysis of bank financial instruments disclosures following the 
introduction of IFRS 7. 
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4.2 Measurement of applicability, compliance and quantity variables 
Our study focuses on the disclosure process (applicability and compliance) and 
outcomes (quantity). Various measures have previously been adopted to capture 
the volume of disclosure. In the case of measuring quantity, Milne and Adler (1999) 
provided a critique of the importance of the unit of analysis. Findings suggest, 
however, that empirical results are similar regardless of the approach taken 
(Hackston and Milne, 1996). We take the number of words as the measure of 
quantity. As this measure is right-skewed, we use natural logarithm of the number 
of words in our regression tests (Miihkinen, 2012). Accuracy checks were manually 
performed for ten of the companies and these showed immaterial levels of 
variation (<0.05).   
To measure compliance and applicability, a checklist was completed5. This 
required checking the annual report disclosure for each firm for compliance with 
IFRS 7’s 133 separate requirements. The scoring index was unweighted and 
dichotomous. Information appropriately disclosed and required was marked as ‘1’, 
information not disclosed but required ‘0’6, and information not required ‘N/A’. 
Where there was information voluntarily disclosed over and above IFRS 7 
requirements, this was separately noted but did not feature in the above scoring 
mechanism. Our applicability measure (APPL) is then the proportion of total IFRS 7 
requirements applicable and our compliance measure (COMPL) is the proportion 
of IFRS 7 requirements applicable and appropriately met.  
                                            
5 Available on request. 
6 Note, immaterial issues such as spelling and grammar mistakes were not considered to be cases 
of non-compliance. 
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There are rare occasions when making applicability decisions becomes a 
challenging aspect, in particular when accounting for materiality. In the majority of 
cases, it is reasonably straightforward to award a score of ‘1’, ‘0’ or ‘N/A’ because 
the requirement is either relevant to the company, or not. However, an item might 
be deemed immaterial by an entity and therefore no disclosure will be provided; but 
as non-disclosure is a private decision, a judgement must be made by the coder 
whether to mark the checklist ‘0’ or ‘N/A’.   
There were simple cases where omitted disclosures could be measured as 
‘required but not provided’ according to a quantitative scale (e.g. using simple 
measures such as <5% of profit before tax). However, there are subjective areas 
and the decision becomes less formulaic. In rare cases, it is necessary to cede to 
the judgement of the company and mark the non-disclosure as ‘N/A’. Before this 
notation was blindly recorded, however, the financial statements were reviewed for 
evidence of supporting and corroborating evidence.7  
A common problem with content analysis is the reliability of the results 
(Krippendorff, 2004). To help mitigate this, inter-coder reliability testing was 
undertaken for ten of the companies to ensure the results were robust. The Kappa 
coefficients ranged from κ=0.97 to κ=1.00 thus indicating high levels of accuracy, 
stability and reproducibility. 
4.3 Research design 
                                            
7 For example, if a company provided no information about their management of market risk, the 
Operating and Financial Review was reviewed alongside any other likely triggers of market risk, for 
example commodities or derivatives trading, and assess whether this risk was material in nature. If 
sufficient evidence exists that this was purposeful non-disclosure then the registered result would 
be ‘0’ rather than ‘N/A’. 
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4.3.1 Empirical models 
To test hypotheses H1 to H4 we run the following regression models: 
H1   
H2  
H3 and H4  
H5a & H5b  
 
where subscript i is a specific company; APPL is applicability level, COMPL is 
compliance, QUAN is quantity of disclosure, LAF is the natural logarithm of audit 
fees, FIMANPROG is a list of variables representing the financial instruments 
management programme, DISCLINC is a list of variables representing the 
incentives to voluntarily disclose information, and CONTROLS are other variable 
known to be associated with audit fees. The variables used to represent 
FINMANPROG and DISCLINC are defined in section 4.3.2.8 Audit fees as well as 
controls variables are defined in section 4.3.3. 
                                            
8 We also conducted testing of models in which, in addition to the above variables, we controlled for 
industry indicators to capture the effect of the industry-specific nature of the business operations 
and disclosures. The direction of the results is qualitatively similar and none of our main conclusions 
change. We do not include industry dummies in our main tests as the addition of seven industry 
variables would reduce the power of our regression tests given our small sample size. For example, 
in telecommunications, there are only two firms and only four firms are in healthcare. The results 
are available on request. 
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To test H5a and H5b we include FIMANPROG and QUAN, as well as 
control variables that capture known audit fee determinants. As SIZE is known to 
be the strongest predictor of audit fees from previous literature, in this context 
FIMANPROG is captured only by FI, RISKEXP and HEDGE. We test H1, H2, H3 
and H4 first using OLS and then assume the observed values represent measured 
variables using Structural Equation Modelling (Path Analysis) techniques.  
Structural equation models are a broad set of mathematical and statistical methods 
that allow one to relax the assumption of linearity and instead fit networks of 
constructs to data. Path analysis is particularly useful in this context because we 
rely on measurement instruments for some key observable variables (e.g. APPL, 
COMPL, QUAN) to test hypotheses on unobservable constructs. The specification 
of input and output paths used in this technique allows us to test both direct effects 
and indirect effects of variables. The hypothesis H5 is tested using OLS, and as 
robustness tests, other techniques to control for endogeneity (see section 5.4 for 
details). 
4.3.2 Independent variables representing FIMANPROG and DISCLINC 
in the regression tests 
The variables used as proxies for a financial instruments management 
programme (FIMANPROG) are: relative size of financial instruments (FI), the total 
size of the company (SIZE), risk exposure of the company (RISKEXP) and whether 
the firm is using financial instruments for speculation or risk-management purposes 
(HEDGE). FI, SIZE and HEDGE are likely to be associated with the scope and 
complexity of the financial management programme of the company, while 
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RISKEXP should measure the financial risk exposure of the company that should 
be managed. 
FI is the sum of cash and cash equivalents, trade receivables, other 
investments, trade payables and short and long-term debt divided by total assets. 
We do not include derivatives in this variable, as derivatives are accounted for 
separately. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. We use the sum of total 
derivative assets and liabilities relative to size as the proxy for the firm’s risk 
exposure (RISKEXP). Given the context, it is important to differentiate between 
those companies that hedge and those that speculate. We therefore develop the 
variable ‘HEDGE’ by identifying ‘speculators’ (1), as distinct from hedgers (0). We 
determine the former as those firms who meet one or more of the following criteria: 
(i) the firm discloses that it uses financial instruments for speculative purposes; (ii) 
the firm discloses – qualitatively or quantitatively – an active material financial 
instruments trading programme from which it derives a separate stream of 
revenues distinct from its core business; (iii) the firm has material gains (losses) 
arising from financial instruments designated as derivatives ‘held for trading’9.  
Although the level of derivatives may appear low (cf. Guay and Kothari, 
2003; Gebhardt, 2012), these instruments are positively associated with a 
company’s exposure to various financial risks - interest rate risk, forward exchange 
risk, commodity risk, and so forth - before hedging is taken into account (Bartram 
et al., 2011). Another advantage of using derivatives in the context of an 
                                            
9 Further details available on request. 
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applicability determinant is that they are directly related to one of the financial items 
that is required to be disclosed.  
As for disclosure incentives (DISCLINC) variables, we follow the extant 
literature. Companies with higher levels of information asymmetry have a greater 
incentive to disclose as this theoretically reduces the cost of capital (adverse 
selection). We proxy for information asymmetry using several variables, as follows. 
It may be reflected in the annual volume of shares traded relative to the number of 
shares that are outstanding. It may also increase if a firm issues equity, and 
increase where the share price is more volatile (e.g. Marshall and Weetman, 2007; 
Lang and Lundholm, 1993).  
To reduce information asymmetry and perceived agency costs from moral 
hazard, firms are thought to disclose more. Agency costs of debt are proxied by 
leverage (e.g. Marshall and Weetman, 2007; Dobler et al., 2011), liquidity – 
measured by the current ratio (Marshall and Weetman, 2007) – and the level of 
closely held shares (Glaum et al., 2013). However, the existence of other sources 
of information may reduce pressure on companies to disclose information in their 
annual reports. Therefore, there may be a negative relationship between the 
number of analysts following a firm (e.g. Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Irani and 
Karamanou, 2003) and the number of news items about the firm in the press (e.g. 
Chalmers and Godfrey, 2004).  
In line with other studies we investigate whether profitability is a determinant 
of compliance and quantity. We note that the direction of any relationship is 
uncertain. There is an argument that more profitable companies are inclined to 
disclose more (Lang and Lundholm, 1993), but more disclosure may drive higher 
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proprietary costs (Heitzman et al., 2010), and may also expose poorly performing 
companies to higher levels of litigation risk (Skinner, 1994). The latter points 
indicate an inverse relation between profitability and disclosure. In addition, 
following Chalmers and Godfrey (2004), we use an indicator variable for firms in 
the oil and mining industry, as these firms may be exposed to higher commodity 
risk, and therefore disclose more. 
The number of variables is large and this could reduce the power of the 
regression tests. Therefore we eliminate insignificant variables to obtain a more 
parsimonious model. The final model includes volume of shares traded (VOLUME), 
number of analysts following the firm (AF), gearing (LEV) and current ratio (CR) as 
proxies for disclosure incentives (DISCLINC). For details of the procedure and 
rationale, see Appendix. A list of definitions of all variables used is presented in 
Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
4.3.3 Independent variables representing audit fee determinants in the 
audit fee tests 
There is an extensive audit pricing literature, launched by the seminal work 
of Simunic (1980). A standard set of variables has emerged that are known to 
control for the main drivers of audit fees – client size, complexity and client risk 
(e.g. Simunic, 1980; McMeeking et al., 2006). The natural logarithm of audit fees 
and the natural logarithm of total assets (client size) are commonly used to reduce 
the degree of skewness. Variations in client risk are captured by the ratio of long 
term debt to total assets (LEV), current ratio (CR), quick ratio (QUICK), inventories 
to assets (INVENTORIES), sales growth (GROWTH) and receivables to total 
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assets (RECEIVABLES). The square root of the total number of subsidiaries 
(SUBSID) and the ratio of the number of foreign subsidiaries to total number of 
subsidiaries (FOREIGN) capture audit complexity. The dichotomous auditor 
change variable (SWITCH) captures the learning curve effect on the first year of 
engagement. The dichotomous indicator variable (‘1’ if the company’s year-end is 
December, ‘0’ otherwise) captures the busiest period in the auditors’ calendar year 
(BUSY). The percentage of shares held by the board of directors (BID), number of 
board meetings (MEET) and the percentage of shares owned by “substantial 
shareholdings” (SO) capture corporate governance factors thought to influence 
audit fees. Although additional variables are advocated by some scholars (see Hay 
et al., 2006 for a summary), the aforementioned variables produce robust results 
that explain the majority of the variation in audit fees across a variety of 
jurisdictions and time settings.  
5. Empirical results 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
There is management discretion due to the broadness of the Standard’s 
scope and this might contribute to disclosure variability. IFRS 7 has 34 balance 
sheet disclosure requirements, a further 10 relate to the income statement and 
equity, 49 relate to risk, 2 relate to adoptions and exemptions, and there are 38 
other requirements (Table 2). The 133 requirements can be further broken down 
as: 57 hard-rules, 47 soft-rules10, and 29 principles (Table 3: Panel A). 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
                                            
10 Hard rules provide guidance as to what is permissible in advance whereas soft rules require 
judgement to be employed. 
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The principles-based requirements cover sensitive issues such as market, 
credit, and liquidity risk, which will differ between entities and periods of account 
according to idiosyncratic policies and decisions. Most of these requirements are 
inherited from its immediate predecessors (105)11, while the remainder (28) are 
new (Table 3: Panel B). 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics of the main variables. The mean level 
of applicability (APPL) is 58.3%, which is similar to its median. No firm was obliged 
to meet all the requirements of IFRS 7; indeed, the firm with the highest 
applicability score was required to meet approximately three-quarters (99 
requirements).  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
The compliance level is high (mean: 94.6%) which, after adjusting for 
applicability, shows that the average firm fails to comply with around four of IFRS 
7’s requirements.12 The standard deviation of compliance is 5.8% suggesting low 
variability. The level of compliance is higher than in comparable studies (e.g. 
Glaum et al., 2013 [73%]; Tsalavoutas, 2011 [<90%]; Hassan et al., 2008 [33%]; 
Lopes and Rodrigues, 2007 [44%]). Explanations for this high compliance rate 
might be that our sample comprises the largest firms, in a developed stock market, 
with strong corporate governance mechanisms, alongside managerial experience 
                                            
11 IAS 30 Disclosures in Financial Statements of Banks and Similar Financial Institutions, IAS 32 
Financial Instruments: Presentation and IAS 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and 
Measurement.  
12 This is obtained by multiplying number of requirements (133) with mean applicability (0.583) and 
non-compliance (1 – 0.946). 
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of applying IAS’ 32 and 39, in a time of heightened anxiety given the challenging 
economic context (financial crisis), and the use of the services of the Big 4 audit 
firms. The average number of words (quantity) is 2,993 (min: 1,085; max: 7,542; 
standard deviation: 1,374). This highlights a considerable variation in quantity 
between firms. The average (maximum) audit fee of £3.759M (£25.7M) are similar 
to other studies and not unsurprising given the data are from the largest 100 
companies in the UK. Skewness falls after taking the natural logarithm and there is 
reasonable variation in LAF across the sample.  
Considering the independent variables in our tests, it is interesting to note 
that financial instruments (excluding derivatives) (FI) are about half the total assets 
on average and the fair value of derivatives (RISKEXP) represents around 3.5% of 
total assets. In a similar vein, Guay and Kothari (2003) find that only 56.7% of 
1,000 US non-financial firms used derivatives. This led them to the conclusion that 
“corporate derivatives use appears to be a small piece of non-financial firms’ 
overall risk profile” (p.423). The level of derivatives in our study is similar to that 
reported in Gebhardt (2012) for STOXX Europe 600 firms in the 2001-2009 period 
of 2.86%. At first glance, these magnitudes may seem small to warrant the 
inclusion of derivatives as a proxy for financial risk exposure. However, variations 
in market conditions as well as managerial policies and decisions, imply that these 
instruments have the power to be economically significant and materially affect a 
company’s position and performance (as seen many times before e.g. Enron, 
WorldCom, etc.). Furthermore, the use of derivatives is important to determining 
IFRS 7 disclosure and applicability given the number of requirements related 
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thereto.13 In our sample, 12 firms (20.7%) are identified to use financial instruments 
for speculative purposes (HEDGE variable). 
5.2 Correlation analysis 
Correlation analysis allows us to analyse univariate relations between 
variables and provides a preliminary view of the validity of our hypotheses (Table 
5). For the sake of brevity, we do not include full set of predictors of audit fees as 
the majority of these variables are known to predict audit fees from previous 
literature and do not form part of the specifications of other tests. First, we note that 
only correlations higher than 0.20 in absolute amounts are statistically significant, 
both for Pearson and Spearman correlations. In line with H1, APPL is positively 
correlated with SIZE (Pearson coefficient of 0.665 and Spearman of 0.669), 
RISKEXP (Pearson coefficient of 0.512 and Spearman of 0.612) and HEDGE 
(Pearson coefficient of 0.266 and Spearman of 0.316). However, APPL is not 
statistically significantly correlated with FI. COMPL is not statistically significantly 
correlated to any of the proxies for disclosure incentives, contrary to H2. QUAN is 
significantly positively correlated with both APPL (Pearson coefficient of 0.448 and 
Spearman of 0.510) and COMPL (Pearson coefficient of 0.326 and Spearman of 
0.355) in line with our hypothesis, H3. We also find that QUAN is significantly 
positively correlated with SIZE and RISKEXP, in line with H4. FI is significantly and 
positively correlated with LAF, and QUAN is significantly and negatively correlated 
with LAF. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
                                            
13 For example, there are 12 requirements that relate to hedging alone. 
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Within the group of independent variables, there is a high positive 
correlation between FI and LEV of 0.609 (Pearson) and 0.629 (Spearman). This is 
because these two variables share an important variable in the numerator – short- 
and long-term debt. In line with previous literature, SIZE is strongly positively 
correlated with AF and negatively correlated to VOLUME and CR. AF is negatively 
correlated to FI, and LEV to CR. Unsurprisingly, HEDGE is positively correlated 
with FI and RISKEXP. Other correlations between independent variables are 
statistically insignificant. 
5.3 Tests of hypotheses on determinants of applicability, compliance 
and quantity of disclosure 
Table 6 presents the regression results for the relation between applicability 
and proxies for financial instrument management programmes (FIMANPROG): FI, 
SIZE, RISKEXP and HEDGE. Univariate regressions (models 1, 2, 3 and 4) 
demonstrate the positive relation of APPL with SIZE, RISKEXP and HEDGE, but 
not with FI. Multivariate OLS regressions (model 5) demonstrate that these four 
variables explain 58% of the variability in applicability. Estimation using the SEM 
technique (model 6) does not materially change the results for SIZE, RISKEXP, FI 
and HEDGE.  
The effects of SIZE, RISKEXP and HEDGE on APPL are economically 
significant. In a joint model, i.e. 5, an increase in one standard deviation of SIZE 
(corresponding to roughly tripling of total assets) leads to a 3.7 percentage points 
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increase in APPL, which is around 56% of a standard deviation of APPL.14 An 
increase of one standard deviation in RISKEXP leads to a 2 percentage point 
increase in APPL, approximately one third of its standard deviation. If a company 
uses derivatives for speculative purposes, instead for risk management, the APPL 
increases in 3.2 percentage points, or roughly 50% of its standard deviation. These 
results are consistent with H1, when SIZE, RISKEXP and HEDGE are considered, 
but not consistent when FI is considered.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
Table 7 presents the regression results for the relation between compliance 
and disclosure incentives (DISCLINC): VOLUME, AF, LEV and CR. We find that 
variables proxying for disclosure incentives are not related to compliance (Model 
1). Jointly, they explain only around 7% or variability in COMPL and none of them 
are significant. This is unsurprising given the descriptive statistics pertaining to 
COMPL (i.e. high compliance, low standard deviation). Unreported results remain 
almost identical when we control for APPL and proxies for FIMANPROG, with a 
modest increase in R2 but negative adjusted R2. Therefore, we do not find support 
for H2.  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
Table 8 presents results regarding the association between the quantity of 
disclosures and applicability, compliance, and proxies for financial instrument 
management programmes. Firstly, we regress QUAN on disclosure incentives as 
                                            
14 We obtained this effect by multiplying the standard deviation of size (1.147) with the coefficient of 
0.032 which gives 0.037. As the standard deviation of APPL is 0.065, the ratio 0.037/0.065 is 
approximately 0.56 or 56%. The same procedure is applied for RISKEXP. 
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the benchmark model (Model 1). VOLUME, AF, LEV, and CR explain 26% of the 
variability in QUAN. QUAN is statistically significantly related with VOLUME and 
LEV at the 5% level. Secondly, we regress QUAN only on APPL and COMPL 
individually and jointly (Models 2 to 4) to test H3. Individually, APPL and COMPL 
have a statistically positive association with QUAN, explaining 20% and 11% of the 
variability respectively. In the joint regression, both coefficients on APPL and 
COMPL are positive (2.744 and 1.943) and significant at the 5% level, respectively 
explaining around 26% of variability in QUAN. The magnitude of the effect is also 
significant. An increase in one standard deviation of APPL (COMPL) is associated 
with an 18% (12%) increase in QUAN.  
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
Regressions presented in models 5 to 8 test our hypothesis H4 regarding 
the relation between FIMANPROG and QUAN. The results show that SIZE and 
RISKEXP are statistically positively related to QUAN explaining individually 17% 
and 13% of the variability in QUAN (models 6 and 7), while the coefficient on FI 
and HEDGE is statistically insignificant (models 5 and 8). Jointly, these four 
FIMANPROG proxies explain 25% of variability in QUAN, with SIZE and RISKEXP 
remaining statistically significant (model 9).  
It is possible that the relationship between APPL and COMPL with QUAN 
may be driven by omitted variables. Therefore, it is necessary to see whether the 
positive association of APPL and COMPL with QUAN stands after controlling for 
FIMANPROG as the determinant of APPL. In model 10, therefore, we include 
APPL, COMPL, as well as proxies for FIMANPROG and controls for DISCLINC. 
Both APPL and COMPL coefficients significantly reduce in size relative to model 4 
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and become statistically insignificant from zero. The decrease in the coefficient is 
particularly dramatic for APPL: from the estimated 2.744 in model 4 to 0.457 in 
model 10. By contrast, SIZE and RISKEXP as the proxies for FIMANPROG remain 
significant at the 5% level, with SIZE having similar magnitude comparing to model 
9 and the coefficient on RISKEXP reduced. The results for SIZE and RISKEXP are 
economically significant. The coefficients of 0.137 indicate that an increase of one 
standard deviation in SIZE is associated with an increase of around one third of 
standard deviation of QUAN. As for RISKEXP, the coefficients of 1.956 indicate 
that an increase of one standard deviation in RISKEXPL is associated with an 
increase of around one fifth of standard deviation of QUAN. The model 10 explains 
50% of the variability in QUAN. Results from path analysis are very similar to those 
in Table 10. 
 One potential concern is that FIMANPROG variables and QUAN respond to 
similar underlying economic factors. For example, risky firms with aggressive sales 
growth may face higher credit and liquidity risk which is reflected in higher level of 
FIMANPROG variables, and, independently of FIMANPROG, in higher disclosure 
quantity. As a consequence, the effect of FIMANPROG on QUAN could be biased 
upwards because of this correlated omitted variable issue. To alleviate this 
endogeneity concern we employ instruments that are likely to affect the second 
stage variable only through their effect on the endogenous variables. We 
instrument statistically significant FIMANPROG in OLS tests in Table 8 (SIZE and 
RISKEXP) using industry-median SIZE, and RISKEXP, respectively. The p-values 
are both marginally significant at the 10% level. We ascertain the appropriateness 
of instrumental variables estimation using the Hausman (1978) test of whether the 
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IV estimator is significantly different from the OLS estimator. The Hausman (1978) 
test statistic (p=0.24) suggests that correlated omitted variables are not a concern 
in this specification.  
Overall, results are consistent with H4 but not with H3. APPL ceases to be 
associated with QUAN once proxies for FIMANPROG are included. In other words, 
FIMANPROG is so strong a determinant of APPL and QUAN that the remaining 
variance of APPL, once controlled for FIMANPROG, has a negligible effect on 
QUAN.15 
5.4 Tests of hypotheses on financial instruments management 
programme, applicability, compliance and quantity of disclosures on audit 
fees 
Table 9 presents the results of the tests concerning the economic effects of 
financial instruments management programme and financial instruments 
disclosures on audit fees. Similar to prior studies, SIZE, SUBSID, FOREIGN, and 
BUSY (at the 5% level) plus RECEIVABLES and MEET (at the 10% level) explain 
a large proportion of the variability in audit fees. In this setting, the proxies for 
FIMANPROG include only FI, RISKEXP and HEDGE. SIZE is used as a control 
variable because the previous literature firmly establishes SIZE as a most 
important determinant of audit fees, and consequently it cannot be interpreted only 
as a proxy for FIMANPROG. In a joint model that includes all three FIMANPROG 
                                            
15 In additional tests (not reported) we find that financial instruments management programme and 
disclosure incentives explain 80% of disclosure quantity when the level of applicability is below 
median and only 47% of disclosure quantity when the level of applicability is above median, in line 
with Heitzman et al. (2010) conjencture that disclosure incentives are more important in mandatory 
environment when materiality thresholds are low. 
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proxies and QUAN (column 5 of Table 9), and partially consistent with H5a, we 
observe a statistically significant positive association between LAF and FI, but not 
between LAF and RISKEXP nor between LAF and HEDGE.  
The economic effect of FI on audit fees is important – an increase of one 
standard deviation in FI leads to 27% increase in audit fees. This implies auditors 
charge a premium to firms with large amounts of financial instruments to 
compensate them for the additional risk required to audit these complex financial 
instruments. QUAN is significantly and negatively associated with audit fees in a 
full model (column 5 of Table 9), consistent with H5b. The economic effect is 
important: one percent increase in quantity of disclosure reduces audit fees by 
around one half of one percent. Allowing for the additional risk associated with 
firms that have large amounts of non-derivative financial instruments (FI), this 
finding suggests that the quantity of financial instruments disclosures (QUAN) can 
reduce the audit risk premium and this is conferred to the company by reduced 
fees. These results indicate that lower fees might be the result of disclosures 
reducing information asymmetry and improving the information environment, but 
we leave tests of this exact mechanism for future research.    
[Insert Table 9 about here???] 
A potential limitation in interpreting OLS results is that the quantity of 
disclosure and audit fees may be endogenously determined. In the context of this 
paper, managers do not make financial instruments management programme 
decisions randomly, but on the basis of expectations on how their choices will 
influence disclosures, and how these in turn might affect economic outcomes. For 
example, in order to reduce audit fees managers may choose simpler financial 
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policies, which would translate into simpler disclosure and, consequently, lower 
audit effort and audit fees. By contrast, in distressed firms the level of non-
derivative financial instruments might be large and requires more auditor attention. 
Thus, a negative association between FI and LAF found in the OLS regression 
could be wrongly attributed to the level of financial instruments rather than the 
higher riskiness of the firm. As for the relation between disclosure quantity and 
audit fees, after controlling for the level of financial instruments, it seems that 
managers with low proprietary costs may choose a strategy of higher transparency 
because more disclosures appear to reduce audit fees. In this setting, the effect of 
proprietary costs on audit fees through disclosure could be erroneously attributed 
to the substitute effect of quantity on disclosure, in so much as it reduces 
information asymmetry.  
To deal with the endogeneity, we introduce a two-stage least squares 
regression in which the level of non-derivative financial instruments and quantity of 
disclosure variables are instrumented. We use the industry median of the level of 
non-derivative financial instruments and the industry median of quantity of 
disclosure to instrument FI and QUAN, respectively. As unobservable distress and 
proprietary costs are arguably firm-specific attributes, industry medians reflect 
exogenous industry differences in levels of FI and QUAN, while being orthogonal to 
distress and proprietary costs. As such, they are likely to affect the second-stage 
audit fee variable only through their influence on the endogenous variables, QUAN 
and FI. Industry-median QUAN and industry-median FI are calculated using the 
sample of non-financials from the FTSE100 index. Industries are defined at a 
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broad level to ensure that there are sufficient (more than three) observations in 
each sector (and avoid small sample sector-level econometric issues). 
We initially compute the predicted values of QUAN and FI by estimating 
first-stage regressions in which QUAN and FI are the dependent variables and the 
independent variables include all the exogenous variables from the second stage 
regression and the chosen instruments. We then use the predicted values of 
QUAN and FIMANPROG as independent variables instead of their actual values in 
the second stage regression using the following specification: 
 
Controls include ten predictors of audit fees from Table 9 plus two proxies 
for FIMANPROG not significant in Table 9 (RISKEXP and HEDGE).  
We report the results of the first-stage and second-stage regressions with 
associated test statistics in Table 10. We tested our instruments against a barrage 
of relevance (correlation with the endogenous variable) and validity (orthogonality 
to the residual) conditions. Firstly, the coefficient of each instrument must be 
statistically significant in the first stage regressions because this indicates that the 
instruments are relevant. Secondly, the F-statistic associated with every 
endogenous variable must be statistically significant, thus indicating that the 
instruments selected are jointly relevant. The coefficient on industry-median FI 
(0.657) and industry-median QUAN (0.635) are significant at the 1% level in the 
first stage regressions. Moreover, the F statistics for the endogenous variables 
exceed 10, partial F-statistic exceeds 2, and both are statistically significant. The 
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Hausman (1978) test statistic (F=11.34) is significant at the 1% level, suggesting 
the existence of an endogeneity issue. 
The coefficient on Predicted FI is 1.196 and Predicted QUAN is -0.512, 
which are both significant at the 5% level, and the coefficients are very similar to 
those obtained in the OLS regressions. In summary, regardless of the methodology 
we adopt to control for endogeneity, we find a statistically and economically 
significant relation between audit fees, FI and QUAN. 
[Insert Table 10 about here??] 
 
5. Summary and conclusions 
This study examines the determinants of applicability, compliance and 
quantity of financial instruments disclosures as well as the economic effects of 
disclosure on audit fees. In a departure from prior studies, we consider both 
compliance and applicability as the intermediate stages of the disclosure process 
that might explain overall levels of disclosure. We focus on the role of financial 
instruments management programmes as the determinant of applicability and 
quantity of disclosures.  
Following this we look at the differences in applicability and compliance 
across the nature of information, the type of disclosure and the length of past use 
of requirements. This is a timely and relevant study given the poor current state of 
knowledge regarding non-financial firms’ financial instruments disclosures 
(Gebhardt, 2012).  
We find a strong positive relation between applicability and (a) size, (b) the 
level of total derivative assets and liabilities to total assets and (c) the extent of 
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speculative activities, but the association with the relative size of financial 
instruments (d) is insignificant. These four variables explain about 58% of the 
variability of applicability in our sample.  
We completed a full IFRS 7 compliance review for non-financial firms in the 
FTSE 100 for years commencing on or after 1 January 2007. We found relatively 
high levels of compliance (e.g. Tsalavoutas, 2011; Hassan et al., 2008; Lopes and 
Rodrigues, 2007). Given this, it is unsurprising that we are not able to detect any 
significant determinants of compliance in our regression tests. Nevertheless, we do 
not find that ignorance or misinterpretation (Glaum et al., 2013) have a significant 
impact on compliance. 
As for the determinants of quantity of disclosure, we do not find a statistically 
significant relation between applicability or compliance with quantity after 
controlling for disclosure incentives. By contrast, size and the level of total 
derivative assets and liabilities to total assets are statistically and economically 
significantly positively related to quantity.  
Financial instruments are economically significant in two distinct ways. First, 
accounting firms charge an audit firm premium to companies that have high levels 
of non-derivative financial instruments to compensate them for the additional time 
and resource needed to provide assurance about these complex instruments. 
Second, one percent increase in the amount of financial instruments disclosures is 
associated with around one half of one percent lower audit fees. We conjecture 
that the lower audit risk premium finding might be due to reductions in information 
asymmetry and improvements in the information environment that are captured 
within the audit risk premium. This is a potentially fruitful area of future research.  
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This study is amongst the first to consider the importance of the link 
between the mandatory disclosure process (applicability and compliance) and the 
disclosure outcome (comprehensiveness of disclosure measured by quantity) as 
well as to investigate firm-specific determinants related to financial instruments 
management programmes other than voluntary disclosure incentives. The results 
show the first-order importance of financial instruments management programmes 
for the applicability and comprehensiveness of disclosure, as well as the limited 
role that attributes of the disclosure process contribute to the quantity. The findings 
also indicate potentially important economic impact of disclosure on reducing audit 
fees.  
As all studies, ours suffers from certain limitations. First, our sample is small. 
While this should work against us finding support for our hypotheses due to power 
issues, future research may extend the sample to mid-sized and smaller 
companies, which would also carry the benefit of incorporating more medium- and 
small-sized audit firms into the sample. In addition, future research may consider 
this link in the cross-country context and the interaction between institutions, 
compliance and disclosure outcome, as the previous studies have focused only on 
the role of institutions shaping compliance (Glaum et al., 2013). Second, we also 
mainly look at an early stage of adoption of the accounting standard and we cannot 
provide insights on whether and how disclosure practices patterns change over 
time, within industries or countries. Finally, our study raises important questions 
about managerial discretion in a mandatory financial reporting setting, and this 
subject requires urgent attention. Intervention seems to happen at the compliance 
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and quantity levels, and we show the implications of this variability on audit fees. 
We urge future researchers to consider alternative measures of economic impact.    
 
References 
Al-Akra, M., Eddie, I., & Ali, M. (2010). The influence of the introduction of accounting 
disclosure regulation on mandatory disclosure compliance: Evidence from Jordan. 
British Accounting Review, 42 (3), 170-186. 
Bamber, M. & McMeeking, K. (2016). An examination of international accounting 
standard-setting due process and the implications for legitimacy. British Accounting 
Review, 48(1), 59-73. 
Bartram, S.M., Brown, G.W. & Conrad, J. (2011). The effects of derivatives on firm 
risk and value. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 46 (4), 967-999. 
Beretta, S., & Bozzolan, S. (2004). A framework for the analysis of firm risk 
communication. International Journal of Accounting, 39(1), 265-288. 
Beyer, A., Cohen, D. A., Lys, T. Z., & Walther, B. R. (2010). The financial reporting 
environment: Review of the recent literature. Journal of Accounting & Economics, 
50(2), 296-343. 
Birt, J., Rankin, M. & Song, C.L. (2013). Derivatives and use of financial instrument 
disclosure in the extractives industry. Accounting & Finance, 53(1), 55-83. 
Bischof, J. (2009). The effects of IFRS 7 adoption on bank disclosure in Europe. 
Accounting in Europe, 6(2), 167-194. 
Bodnar, G. M., Hayt, G. S., Marston, R. C., & Smithson, C. W. (1995). Wharton 
survey of derivatives usage by US non-financial firms. Financial Management, 104-
114. 
Botosan, C. A. (1997). Disclosure level and the cost of equity capital. Accounting 
Review, 72(3), 323-349. 
Botosan, C. (2006). Disclosure and the cost of capital: what do we know? 
Accounting and Business Research, (36 Special Issue: International Accounting 
Policy Forum), 31-40. 
 39 
Brooks, C. (2008). Introductory econometrics for finance. Cambridge University 
Press. 
Brown, P., & Tarca, A. (2005). A commentary on issues relating to the enforcement 
of International Financial Reporting Standards in the EU. European Accounting 
Review, 14(1), 181-212. 
Bushman, R.M., Piotroski, J.D. & Smith, A.J. (2004). What determines corporate 
transparency? Journal of Accounting Research, 42(2), 207-252. 
Campbell, J. L., Chen, H., Dhaliwal, D. S., Lu, H. M., & Steele, L. B. (2011). The 
information content of mandatory risk factor disclosures in corporate filings. Review 
of Accounting Studies, 19(1) 1-60. 
Chalmers, K. (2001). The progression from voluntary to mandatory derivative 
instrument disclosures—look who’s talking. Australian Accounting Review, 11(23), 
34-44. 
Chalmers, K., & Godfrey, J.M. (2004). Reputation costs: the impetus for voluntary 
derivative FI reporting. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 29(2), 95-125. 
Chang, L.S., & Most, K.S. (1985). The perceived usefulness of financial statement 
for investors’ decisions, International University Press, Miami. 
Chernenko, S., & Faulkender, M. (2012). The two sides of derivatives usage: 
Hedging and speculating with interest rate swaps. Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis, 46(06), 1727-1754. 
D’Souza, J., Ramesh, K., & Shen, M. (2010). Disclosure of GAAP line items in 
earnings announcements. Review of Accounting Studies, 15(1), 179-219. 
Daske, H., Hail, L., Leuz, C., & Verdi, R. (2008). Mandatory IFRS reporting around 
the world: Early evidence on the economic consequences. Journal of Accounting 
Research, 46(5), 1085-1142. 
Dobler, M., Lajili, K., & Zéghal, D. (2011). Attributes of corporate risk disclosure: An 
international investigation in the manufacturing sector. Journal of International 
Accounting Research, 10(2), 1-22. 
Dunne, T., Helliar, C., Power, D., Mallin, C., Ow-Yong, K.E.A.N., & Moir, L. (2004). 
The introduction of derivatives reporting in the UK: A content analysis of FRS 13 
disclosures. Journal of Derivatives Accounting, 1(02), 205-219. 
 40 
Gebhardt, G. (2012). Financial instruments in non-financial firms: what do we 
know? Accounting and Business Research, 42 (3), 267-289. 
Géczy, C., Minton, B. A., & Schrand, C. (1997). Why firms use currency 
derivatives. The Journal of Finance, 52(4), 1323-1354. 
Glaum, M., Schmidt, P., Street, D. L., & Vogel, S. (2013). Compliance with IFRS 3-
and IAS 36-required disclosures across 17 European countries: company-and 
country-level determinants. Accounting and Business Research, 43(3), 163-204. 
Grant, K., & Marshall, A. P. (1997). Large UK companies and derivatives. 
European Financial Management, 3(2), 191–208.  
Greene, W. H. (1993). Econometric analysis, 2nd edition, Macmillan Publishing 
Company. 
Guay, W., & Kothari, S. P. (2003). How much do firms hedge with derivatives? 
Journal of Financial Economics, 70(3), 423-461. 
Gujarati, D. (2003). Basic Econometrics. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Hackston, D., & Milne, M. J. (1996). Some determinants of social and 
environmental disclosures in New Zealand companies. Accounting, Auditing & 
Accountability Journal, 9(1), 77-108. 
Hassan, M.S., Mohd-Saleh, N., & Rahman, C., A. (2008). Determinants of FIs 
disclosure quality among listed firms in Malaysia. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1157788 (accessed 18 March 2010) 
Hausman, J. (1978). Specification tests in econometrics. Econometrica, 46 (6), 
1251-1271. 
Hay, D, Kneckel, R. & Wong, N. (2006). Audit fees: a meta-analysis of the effect of 
supply and demand attributes. Contemporary Accounting Research, 23(1), 141-
191. 
Healy, P.M., & Palepu, K.G. (2001). Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, 
and the capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 31(3), 405-440. 
Heitzman, S., Wasley, C., & Zimmerman, J. (2010). The joint effects of materiality 
thresholds and voluntary disclosure incentives on firms’ disclosure decisions. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 49(1), 109-132. 
 41 
Horton, J., Serafeim, G., & Serafeim, I. (2013). Does mandatory IFRS adoption 
improve the information environment?. Contemporary Accounting Research, 30(1), 
388-423. 
ICAEW (2000). No surprises: The case for better risk reporting. London: Financial 
Reporting Committee. Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales. 
International Accounting Standards Board (2010). Conceptual Framework for 
Financial Reporting 2010.  
International Accounting Standards Board (2005). International Financial Reporting 
Standard 7 Financial Instruments: Disclosures.  
International Accounting Standards Board (2005). International Accounting 
Standard 32 Financial Instruments: Presentation. 
International Accounting Standards Committee (1989). Framework for the 
Preparation and Presentation of Financial Statements.  
Irani, A. & Karamanou, I. (2003). Regulation Fair Disclosure, analyst following, and 
analyst forecast dispersion. Accounting Horizons, 17 (1), 15-29. 
Jorgensen, B. N., & Kirschenheiter, M. T. (2003). Discretionary risk disclosures. 
Accounting Review, 78(2), 449-469. 
Krippendorff, K. (2004). Content analysis: An introduction to its methodology. 2nd 
edition, Sage Publications, Beverley Hills. 
Lang, M.H., & Lundholm, R. (1993). Cross-sectional determinants of analyst 
ratings of corporate disclosures. Journal of Accounting Research, 31(2), 246-271. 
Lang, M. H., & Lundholm, R. J. (1996). Corporate disclosure policy and analyst 
behavior. Accounting Review, 71(4), 467-492. 
Lang, M.H., Lins, K.L. & Maffett, M. (2012). Transparency, liquidity, and valuation: 
International evidence on when transparency matters most. Journal of Accounting 
Research, 50(3), 729-774. 
Leuz, C., & Verrecchia, R. E. (2000). The economic consequences of increased 
disclosure. Journal of Accounting Research, 38, 91-124. 
Leuz, C., & Wysocki, P.D. (2008). Economic consequences of financial reporting 
and disclosure regulation: a review and suggestions for future research. Available 
at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1105398 (accessed 2 February 2011). 
 42 
Lopes, P.T., & Rodrigues, L.L. (2007). Accounting for FIs: an analysis of the 
determinants of disclosure in the Portuguese stock exchange. International Journal 
of Accounting, 42(1), 25-56.  
Marshall, A., & Weetman, P. (2007). Modelling transparency in disclosure: the case 
of foreign exchange risk management. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 
34(5‐6), 705-739. 
McMeeking, K., Peasnell, K. & Pope, P. (2006). The determinants of the UK big 
firm premium. Accounting and Business Research, 36(3), 207-232. 
Miihkinen, A. (2012). What Drives Quality of Firm Risk Disclosure?: The impact of 
a national disclosure standard and reporting incentives under IFRS. International 
Journal of Accounting, 47(4), 437-468. 
Milne, M. J., & Adler, R. W. (1999). Exploring the reliability of social and 
environmental disclosures content analysis. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability 
Journal, 12(2), 237-256. 
Pearson, R.W. (2010). Statistical Persuasion, Sage Publications Inc., Thousand 
Oaks, California 
Roulstone, D. T. (1999). Effect of SEC financial reporting release No. 48 on 
derivative and market risk disclosures. Accounting Horizons, 13(4), 343-363. 
Seow, G., & Tam, K. (2002). The usefulness of derivative-related accounting 
disclosures. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 18(3), 273-291. 
Simunic, D. (1980). The pricing of audit services: theory and evidence, Journal of 
Accounting Research, 18(1), 161-190. 
Sinkey Jr., J. F., & Carter, D. A. (2001). Evidence on the financial characteristics of 
banks that do and do not use derivatives. The Quarterly Review of Economics and 
Finance, 40(4), 431-449. 
Skinner, D. (1994). Why firms voluntarily disclose bad news. Journal of Accounting 
Research, 32(1), 38-60. 
Street, D. L., & Gray, S. J. (2002). Factors influencing the extent of corporate 
compliance with International Accounting Standards: summary of a research 
monograph. Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 11(1), 51-
76. 
 43 
Tsalavoutas, I. (2011). Transition to IFRS and compliance with mandatory 
disclosure requirements: What is the signal? Advances in Accounting, 27(2), 390-
405. 
Vergoossen, R.G.A. (1993). The use and perceived importance of annual reports 
by investment analysts in the Netherlands. European Accounting Review, 2(2), 
219-244. 
Verrecchia, R. (2001). Essays on disclosure. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 32(1-3), 97-180. 
Watts, R., & Zimmerman, J. (1986). Positive Accounting Theory, Prentice Hall. 
Woods, M., & Marginson, D.E.W. (2004). Accounting for derivatives: an evaluation 
of reporting practice by UK banks. European Accounting Review, 13(2), 373-390. 
 
  
 44 
APPENDIX  
Issues in the model specification 
One of the limitations of this analysis is the small number of observations 
measured against a relatively large number of independent variables (Gujarati, 
2003). We have identified ten variables that could serve as proxies for disclosure 
incentives from the literature (DISCLINC).  In the model testing hypothesis H3 and 
H4 this sums up to 14 independent variables (excluding APPL and COMPL) with 
the other four being FI, SIZE, RISKEXP and HEDGE representing FIMANPROG. 
The small number of degrees of freedom may seriously reduce the power of our 
tests.  
In this extended model with 14 independent variables testing H4 we find that 
volume of shares traded (VOLUME), number of analysts following (AF), gearing 
(LEV) and liquidity (CR) have the highest t-statistic of all variables reflecting 
DISCLINC. In the spirit of general-to-specific methodology (Brooks, 2008) we 
eliminate sequentially the most insignificant regressors that proxy for disclosure 
incentives to get a more parsimonious model with the quality of satisfying 
“encompassing principle”, i.e. to get a smaller model capable of explaining all of 
the results of larger model. Brooks (2008) notes that for small sample sizes this 
procedure may be impractical if the variables are highly correlated which would 
lead to switches in significance and magnitude of coefficients after selective 
deleting of variables. To deal with this problem, we test if there is an issue of 
multicollinearity. It is believed that if the variance inflation factor (VIF) exceeds 5 
then it is possible that multicollinearity will be a serious issue (Pearson, 2010; 
Gujarati, 2003). Although some of the independent variables show high bivariate 
correlation (results not tabulated), the highest VIF from the regression model is 
2.86.16 Therefore, calculations indicated no multicollinearity issues.  
Furthermore, four variables significant in the extended model remain 
significant in the parsimonious model (excluding APPL and COMPL), while no 
other DISCLINC variable becomes significant. Therefore, it seems that the small 
sample in this case is not a grave obstacle for applying general to specific 
                                            
16 Results available on request. 
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procedure. In addition, the overall explanatory power of the model reduces only 
slightly, while adjusted R2 continuously improves. 
Consequently, we include only VOLUME, AF, LEV and CR as DISCLINC 
variables in the final models testing H3 and H4. 
In the spirit of Bushman et al. (2004) and D´Souza et al. (2010), we also 
conducted factor analysis using principal component method to reduce 
dimensionality. Factor analysis is used to identify and extract common 
unobservable economic motives of disclosure stemming from different variables 
rather than using a number of variables that are purported to reflect the same 
disclosure motive. Four factors are retained using eigenvalue of 1 as a criterion. 
We rotated the factor using varimax criterion to obtain a clearer pattern of the 
factor loadings. However, we fail to identify underlying economic disclosure motive 
of these four factors looking at the individual magnitude of variables´ factor 
loadings. In addition, explanatory power of regressions with four factors as proxies 
for disclosure incentives is smaller in the case of applicability and quantity as 
dependent variables and higher in the case of compliance as the dependent 
variable. For these reasons, we do not present the results from factor analysis. 
Results are available on request. 
 
